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Abstract
A shadow stack validates on-stack return addresses and pre-
vents arbitrary code execution vulnerabilities due to mali-
cious returns. Several recent works demonstrate that without
shadow stack protection, control-flow-integrity—a related se-
curity hardening scheme—is vulnerable to attacks. Above
benefits notwithstanding, shadow stacks have not found mass
adoption due to the high overheads they impose.
In this work, we re-examine the performance viability of
shadow stacks as a binary hardening technique. Our work
is inspired by the design principle of separating mechanism
and policy. Existing research on shadow stacks focus on op-
timizing the implementation of the shadow stack, which is
the mechanism. At a policy level, we define Return Address
Safety (RA-Safety) to formally capture the impact of memory
writes to return addresses. Based on RA-Safety, we design
safe function elision and safe path elision, two novel algo-
rithms to optimize the instrumentation policy for shadow
stacks. These two algorithms statically identify functions and
control-flow paths that will not overwrite any return address
so we can safely elide instrumentation on them. Finally, we
compliment above policy improvements with Register frame,
Binary function inlining, and Dead register chasing; three
new mechanism optimizations.
We evaluate our new shadow stack implementation Shad-
owGuard, with SPEC 2017 and show that it reduces the geo-
metric mean overhead from ~8% to ~2% over an unoptimized
shadow stack. We also evaluate several hardened server bench-
marks including Apache HTTP Server and Redis, and the
results show above techniques significantly reduce the latency
and throughput overheads.
1 Introduction
Shadow stacks prevent control-flow hijacking attacks which
are based on modifying a return address on the call stack.
Shadow stacks maintain a copy of the regular stack in a
** Joint co-authorship
tamper-proof region, and check that both copies match on
all function returns. This scheme is effective against code
reuse attacks like Return-oriented programming (ROP) [27]
and return-to-libc [35].
Precisely checking return-edges using shadow-stacks also
helps to secure other coarse-grained mitigation techniques
such as control-flow integrity (CFI) [1], which locks down the
application run-time control flow to a statically-determined,
safe (but over-approximate) control-flow graph. For example,
a recent work on Control-Flow Bending [6] shows that CFI so-
lutions which do not use shadow stacks can be subverted even
if they use finer-grained return-edge approximation which
allows returning to any of the hardened-function call-sites.
Even with aforementioned benefits, however, shadow
stacks have not found mass adoption due to high overheads.
Thurston et. al. [9] report a geometric mean overhead of 12%
on SPEC 2006 CPU benchmarks. Historically, any mitigation
technique imposing overheads of more than 5% [29] has not
found general adoption. Another recent work [5] implements
a compiler-based shadow stack by using a dedicated register
and shows lower overheads of around 5% can be achieved,
albeit by sacrificing compatibility with unprotected code and
requiring source code. For real-world adoption, however, com-
patibility with unprotected code is highly desired since the
hardened application may be required to work with other
closed source libraries.
In this work, we re-examine the performance viability of
shadow stacks that preserve compatibility with unprotected
code. We observe that when it comes to overhead reduction,
prior work largely stops at optimizing the shadow stack in-
strumentation. From an instrumentation policy vs. mechanism
standpoint, such optimizations can be thought of as improv-
ing the shadow stack mechanism. While such optimizations
could result in significant overhead reductions, we observe
that under a practical threat model, it is possible to statically
establish some safety guarantees for certain code regions
in the application, which allows us to elide shadow stack
instrumentation for certain control-flow paths, or even for
entire functions—resulting in further overhead reductions.
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Instrumentation-elision describes a particular instrumentation
policy for shadow stacks, which does not sacrifice security
and compliments existing research that optimize the shadow
stack mechanism.
We base our instrumentation-elision policy on Return Ad-
dress Safety (RA-Safety) property. We define RA-Safety on
functions (RA-Safetyf ) and on basic blocks (RA-Safetybb). We
can informally state RA-Safety as follows: a given function
or a basic block satisfies RA-Safety if its execution (1) does
not cause stack mutations above the local stack frame starting
from the local return address and (2) does not result in calls
functions that do not satisfy RA-Safety. So by definition, any
code region which satisfies RA-Safety will not modify any of
the return addresses on the run-time call stack.
The simplest example of a function satisfying RA-Safetyf
is a leaf function that does not write to memory. A straight-
forward static analysis could identify such functions. Even if
a function mutates the stack, we can still perform data-flow
analysis on the stack pointer at each stack write and conserva-
tively determine if any writes break RA-Safetyf . In addition,
we analyze the function call graph to extend RA-Safetyf to
non-leaf functions.
RA-Safetybb extends the safety property to intra-procedural
control-flow graph in order to find complete—from function
entry to return—control-flow paths which satisfy RA-Safety.
We develop an algorithm to restrict the shadow stack in-
strumentation to only cover non-RA-Safetybb-abiding intra-
procedural control flows (i.e., control flows containing non-
RA-Safetybb basic blocks), thus eliding instrumentation on
safe paths.
Next, we compliment our instrumentation-elision policy
with several improvements to the shadow stack instrumenta-
tion, i.e., the mechanism. For leaf functions, we implement
the register frame optimization which utilizes an unused regis-
ter to hold the shadow stack frame. The dead register chasing
optimization moves instrumentation from typical instrumen-
tation locations (such as function entry) to search for dead
registers which can be used as scratch space in the instrumen-
tation code, thus reducing instructions emitted to save and
restore register states. Finally, we develop a heuristic for in-
lining short leaf functions and thereby avoid instrumentation
within those.
We implemented our new shadow stack implementation,
ShadowGuard, using Dyninst [25], an established binary anal-
ysis and instrumentation tool. In our initial experiments, how-
ever, Dyninst incurred prohibitive overheads even with the
empty instrumentation (a NOP)—over 100% in some appli-
cations. We therefore improved Dyninst’s instrumentation
trampoline generation and exception-handling support and
brought the framework overhead close to zero. We are at-
tempting to upstream our changes to mainstream Dyninst
and hope that our improvements can benefit other security
researchers.
Our evaluations on SPEC 2017 CPU benchmarks show that
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Figure 1: A call tree with a mix of safe and unsafe functions
with respect to memory writes. Functions shown in gray fea-
ture memory writes which break RA-Safetyf . Even though
c does not contain unsafe writes it calls unsafe f and hence
breaks RA-Safetyf . Dotted line marks the frontier between
safe and unsafe functions (with respect to RA-Safetyf ) ob-
tained by traversing safe functions from bottom up.
our policy and mechanism optimizations reduce the geometric
mean overhead from 8.1% to 2.4% over the unoptimized
instrumentation. We also benchmarked hardened Redis and
Apache HTTP servers, and with our optimized shadow stack,
the throughput degradation in various benchmark settings was
significantly lower.
In summary, in this paper we present a novel shadow stack
implementation named ShadowGuard, which follows a two-
pronged approach for reducing shadow-stack overheads using
(1) instrumentation-elision and (2) instrumentation code op-
timizations, both based on binary static analysis, with the
following specific contributions:
• We define RA-Safety under a practical threat model
and describe a set of static analyses which determine
RA-Safety of a given function or a basic block.
• We devise safe function elision and safe path elision—
two algorithms that perform instrumentation elision on
inter- and intra-procedural control flows, respectively,
based on RA-Safety.
• We formally prove that safe function elision and safe
path elision preserve run-time return-edge safety by not
skipping instrumentation checks on any unsafe function
return.
• We describe several novel shadow-stack instrumentation
optimizations which compliment the overhead reduc-
tions obtained with instrumentation elision.
• We significantly reduce Dyninst’s binary instrumentation
overhead which improves its utility for security research.
2
2 Instrumentation Elision Overview
Instrumentation elision reduces shadow-stack overhead by
cutting down the dynamic instruction footprint of the instru-
mentation. We base safe function elision on RA-Safetyf and
safe path elision on RA-Safetybb as follows:
Safe Function Elision Consider the call tree in Figure 1.
Here, leaf functions d and e are safe with respect to RA-Safetyf
and hence eligible for instrumentation elision. Furthermore,
RA-Safetyf is a structurally defined property on the call
graph—that is, only if all the callees of a function are safe,
the function it self is safe, given there are no unsafe memory
writes within the function. Since b doesn’t have unsafe callees
b also satisfies RA-Safetyf . However, function c is unsafe due
to the call to f even though it doesn’t feature unsafe memory
writes within itself. In practice this means that function f may
overwrite function c’s return since f may write above its stack
frame. In Section 4 we describe an iterative algorithm for
propagating RA-Safetyf through the call graph.
This bottom-up instrumentation elision typically results
in significant overhead reductions since functions deep in
the call graph at/near the leaves (1) tend to be short lived
and thus the instrumentation overhead as a percentage of
function execution time is higher, and (2) are more frequently
executed, contributing more to the execution frequency of
instrumentation.
Safe Path Elision We further propagate RA-Safety through
intra-procedural control-flow graph with RA-Safetybb. Now
let’s assume the unsafe leaf function f has the control-flow
graph as shown in Figure 2. Any control-flow path containing
the RA-Safetybb breaking basic block 4 may overwrite return
address at current frame or any other frame above it. However,
there are paths such as 1 -> 6 and 1 -> 2 -> 3 -> 5 -> 6 which
are safe. With typical entry and exit block instrumentation at
blocks 1, 6 and 7 we would be doing redundant shadow stack
checks for such safe paths. If these safe paths are frequently
taken the redundant instrumentation cost would be significant.
Safe path elision removes such inefficiencies by lowering
the instrumentation from function entry to only cover path
segments which feature unsafe basic blocks. In Figure 2 the
naive solution is to introduce shadow stack instrumentation
covering all incoming and outgoing edges of basic block 4.
However such a solution is not ideal since now the stack check
will happen many times as the number of loop iterations, as
the basic block 4 is contained within a loop. In Section 6 we
develop an algorithm for safe path elision with the follow-
ing guarantee—after instrumentation lowering, any unsafe
run-time control-flow graph walk (i.e, cycles included) will
execute exactly one shadow stack check. Additionally, the
algorithm ensures that stack operations happen in pairs and
in correct order (i.e a stack pop must follow a push).
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Figure 2: An intra-procedural control-flow graph featuring a
mix of safe and unsafe basic blocks. Basic block 4 shown in
gray features unsafe memory writes. Sink blocks (e.g: return
blocks) are shown in double rectangles. Any control-flow
path going through basic block 4 is unsafe.
Furthermore, we can extend safe path elision to unsafe non-
leaf functions. Let’s consider function c in Figure 1 which
is unsafe by the virtue of calling the unsafe f. None of its
basic blocks contain unsafe memory writes. So we extend the
definition of RA-Safetybb so that, any basic block featuring a
call to an unsafe function is unsafe. Now we can consider the
control-flow paths containing the unsafe basic block involving
the function call to f and apply safe path elision. In Section 6
we provide a safety proof for safe path elision with respect to
both intra-procedural and inter-procedural control-flow.
3 Threat Model and RA-Safety
We assume the following threat model for instrumentation
elision.
Threat Model We assume that the process is running with
non-executable data and non-writeable code which enforced
by the hardware [17]. We assume that an attacker may cause
arbitrary memory writes within the thread-local stack or
within the heap. However, a thread may not overwrite an-
other thread’s stack in order cause a meaningful exploit. We
note that this threat model similar to the ones assumed in
other shadow stack research [5, 9], but is somewhat more re-
laxed than the threat models assumed in previous literature
for control flow integrity [6]. We believe this model is still
practical because:
1. Attempts at overwriting different thread stacks with con-
tiguous buffer overflows in the heap or within a thread-
local stack should, with high probability, lead to accesses
3
to unmapped or write protected memory before non-
local thread stacks are reached due to the sparsity of
mapped virtual-memory regions and thread-stack guard
pages [31].
2. Leveraging non-contiguous writes would be difficult,
since reliably identifying stack references containing
returns requires precise knowledge of the stack frame
layout of a thread at given point of time and precisely
timing the address overwrite due to ephemeral nature of
stack frames.
Under the above threat model we now formally define
RA-Safetybb for basic blocks and RA-Safetyf for functions.
RA-Safety Let f be a function and bb be a basic block
within the function f. Let insi, i ∈ {0, ..,n} be an instruction
within the function f given that function f contains n instruc-
tions. Let fblocks be the set of basic blocks belonging to the
function f. Let bbins be the set {i, .., j} with i, j ∈ {0, ..,n}
where the instruction range from insi to ins j belongs to bb.
Let the set of inter-procedural targets (i.e., functions) incident
on the outgoing edges of the basic block bb be given by bbinter.
Note here we consider basic blocks ending with returns as
containing no outgoing edges. Basic blocks terminating with
direct or indirect calls will have nonempty bbinter. Assuming
downward stack growth, let stack-height of a stack memory
reference be the address offset of the reference with respect
to the stack frame start address. We define stack frame to con-
tain the return address of the caller. Hence the stack-height at
function entry is -word-size, where word-size is the size of a
memory reference in the system.
Now, we define the flat dataflow lattice Lh = (Z ∪
{>,⊥},v) and the identity abstraction function αh : Z→ Z,
such that αh(n) = n.
We also define variables hi which hold the stack-height
of the destination memory operand of each insi. We now
assume a h: N→ Lh, a map that gives the fixed point values
for hi at insi after carrying out a stack-height analysis at each
instruction insi in function f.
Next, we define a flat lattice Lrs = ({True,False,>,⊥},v)
and abstraction function αrs, such that:
αrs(true) = True
αrs( f alse) = False.
Now, we assume that the flow function Ff is given as:
Ff : Function×Heights×Lrs −→ Lrs
Given a function f, some h and some incoming data flow infor-
mation d, Ff ( f ,h,d) returns outgoing data flow information.
Similarly, we assume a flow function Fbb given as:
Fbb : Block×Heights×Lrs −→ Lrs
Fbb accepts a basic block as the first argument.
Let bbl : Lrs and fl : Lrs contain basic block and function
data flow information for bb and f respectively. Now, we
define flow functions Ff and Fbb as follows.
Ff ( f ,h,d) = dunionsq ( unionsq
bb∈ fblocks
Fbb(bb,h,bbl))
Fbb(bb,h,d) =
dunionsq join_writes(h,bbins)unionsq join_targets(h,bbinter)
where
join_writes(h, ins) = unionsq
i∈ins
write_sa f ety(h, i)
write_sa f ety(h, i) =
{
αrs(true) if is_sa f e(h(i))
αrs( f alse) otherwise
is_sa f e(height) = (height 6=>)∧ (height ≤ -word-size)
join_targets(h, inter) = unionsq
f∈inter
Ff ( f ,h, fl)
Now we can define RA-Safetyf and RA-Safetybb for a function
and a basic block respectively.
RA-Safetyf ( f )=
{
true if ( f ix(Ff ( f ))unionsqTrue)v True
f alse otherwise
RA-Safetybb(bb)=
{
true if ( f ix(Fbb(bb))unionsqTrue)v True
f alse otherwise
Here fix is the least fixed point of each flow function
for a given basic block or a function under a given stack
height analysis h and initial flow conditions bbl =⊥, fl =⊥
respectively.
4 RA-Safety Implementation
RA-Safety for basic blocks and functions can be calculated
using an iterative algorithm based on work lists. We first cal-
culate the connected components from the call graph, with
special handling for indirect calls described below, and carry
out the iterative algorithm on the resulting directed acyclic
graph with a bottom-up post order traversal. CALCULAT-
ERASAFETY outlines the algorithm.
The input to the algorithm is a stack height analysis h which
maps each instruction to a stack height of destination operand.
For instructions not featuring a memory write the height is
defined as ⊥. Also, the analysis h must be sound, meaning
that h can map a stack write to >, but h cannot map a non-
stack write to a concrete stack height. In order to obtain h, we
use the stack height analysis in Dyninst’s DataflowAPI [10]
which is an intra-procedural analysis that maps each register
at each instruction to a stack height lattice Lh. The stack
height analysis tracks the effect of each instruction on the
stack pointer and its aliases. Since Lh is a flat lattice, if a
function dynamically grows the stack in a loop, we will map
stack writes in the loop to >.
In line 15, Fbb determines whether a basic block contains
unsafe memory writes or unsafe function calls. For binary
analysis, it is extremely difficult to precisely determine the call
targets of indirect calls. Therefore, we assume that indirect
calls are unsafe, and our Fbb implementation returns f alse
when the basic block contains an indirect call.
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1: procedure CALCULATERASAFETY( h )
2: callGraph← CallGraph()
3: sccDAG← ConnectedComponents(callGraph)
4: result← {b0, ..,bn =⊥, f0, .., fn =⊥}
5: for scc in postOrderIterator(sccDAG) do
6: ProcessComponent(scc,h,result)
7: return result
8:
9: procedure PROCESSCOMPONENT( scc, h, result )
10: fns← scc.functions
11: blocks← fns.blocks
12: workList← blocks
13: while workList 6= /0 do
14: bi← workList.removeNext()
15: new← Fbb(bi,h,result[bi])
16: if new 6= result[bi] then
17: for pred ∈ predecessorinter(bi) do
18: workList.append(pred)
19: result[bi]← new
20: for fi ∈ f ns do
21: result[ fi]← Ff ( fi,h,result[ fi])
In line 17, predecessorinter gives the set of inter-procedural
predecessors of a given basic block. It will return the empty
set for any non-entry basic block. Here indirect call edges
are irrelevant as a function that contains an indirect call is
assumed to be unsafe. The fix point data flow information in
the returned result map from CALCULATERASAFETY can be
used to determine RA-Safety of any function or basic block
as shown in section 3.
5 Safe Function Elision
Using RA-Safetyf , we perform Safe Function Elision—
instrumentation elision on functions. Before formally stat-
ing the safety property of Safe Function Elision we define
Validation-Soundness which defines the soundness of instru-
mentation with respect to return-edge safety.
Validation-Soundness Any return address modification
on the call-stack will be detected by some shadow-stack
instrumentation check.
Now, given a function satisfying RA-Safetyf we claim the
following,
Safe Function Elision Property Eliding instrumenta-
tion at any function which satisfies RA-Safetyf preserves
validation-soundness.
We provide a proof for the above claim.
Proof : Given a leaf function f0 satisfying RA-Safetyf
let’s assume a run-time call stack S with function f0 on
the top of the stack (i.e function f0 is being executed on
the processor). Let’s assume S contains call stack frames
s f0, ...,s fn with s f0 being the top of the stack call stack
frame belonging to function f0. Also let fi be the function
associated with the call stack frame s fi. Let s f rai be the stack
reference to return address at call stack frame s fi.
First, we present the following lemma about RA-Safetyf .
Lemma 5.1. Given a call stack S and the associated call
chain f0, ..., fn,
¬RA-Safetyf ( f0) =⇒ ¬RA-Safetyf ( fi), i ∈ 1, ..,n.
Proof : We provide an inductive proof on the call chain.
Let’s consider the function f1. There must be a basic
block bb in f1 ending with a call to f0. According the
flow function Fbb, bb satisfies ¬RA-Safetybb(bb) due to
the unsafe inter-procedural edge to f0. Now, according to
Ff , f1 satisfies ¬RA-Safetyf ( f1) since b is unsafe. Now
lets assume ¬RA-Safetyf ( fk). Following a similar argu-
ment as before we can show ¬RA-Safetyf ( fk+1). Hence
¬RA-Safetyf ( fi), i ∈ 0, ..,n.
Now, we do case analysis on the leaf function f0.
Case1 : RA-Safetyf ( f0). By definition of RA-Safetyf , f0
cannot contain writes to any s f rai , i ∈ {0, ..,n}. Hence
instrumentation elision at f0 will not miss a return address
modification to s f ra0
Case2 : ¬RA-Safetyf ( f0). We consider two sub-cases here.
Function overwrites s f ra0 : Since the function is not
RA-Safe we do not elide instrumentation at f0. Therefore,
the shadow-stack check at f0 will detect the return address
modification.
Function overwrites s f rai for some i ∈ {1, ..,n} : The
check at f0 will not detect this overwrite. But according
to the Lemma 5.1 fi satisfies ¬RA-Safetyf ( fi). Hence, no
instrumentation elision is performed at fi. Therefore, the
return address modification at s f rai will be detected at fi’s
return.
So far we have proved that Safe Function Elision
Property holds for any leaf function f0 and any non-leaf
function fi with a call to an unsafe function. The final case
is any non-leaf function featuring unsafe memory writes,
but not performing any unsafe child calls. In this case, by
definition, the function still satisfies ¬RA-Safetyf . So the
instrumentation will not be elided. Hence Safe Function
Elision Property holds for any given function.
5
6 Safe Path Elision
In this section we extend instrumentation elision to the intra-
procedural CFG. Given that some of the basic blocks within
a function satisfy RA-Safetybb, certain control-flow paths
through the function may be safe. If these safe control-flow
paths are taken frequently, we can reduce instrumentation
overhead by eliding shadow-stack instrumentation on those
paths. For example, a memoized function is one instance
where such an invocation pattern is typical, where the ini-
tial computation may lead to a unsafe memory write, which
memorizes the result, but the subsequent invocations fetch the
memoized value with just memory read (no unsafe memory
write).
We perform instrumentation lowering in order to push
the instrumentation down in the intra-procedural CFG so
that it covers any unsafe control-flow path segment. In order
to preserve validation-soundness and avoid performance
degradations, instrumentation lowering needs to satisfy the
following constraints.
• Lowering must cover every unsafe control-flow path with
exactly one shadow-stack check.
• Shadow-stack operations should match in the correct
order when traversing any control flow path (i.e., a stack
push must be followed by a stack pop in that order).
1: procedure DOINSTRUMENTATIONLOWERING( g, h )
2: g′,vertexMap← CloneCFG(g)
3: visited← /0
4: for exit ∈ g′exits do
5: AppendStackPop(exit)
6: DFSVisit(groot ,NULL,vertexMap,visited,h)
7:
8: procedure DFSVISIT(block, edge, map, visited, h)
9: if ¬RA-Safetybb(block) then
10: RedirectEdge(edge,map[block])
11: stackHeightAtEntry← h[min(blockins)]
12: AppendStackPush(edge,stackHeightAtEntry)
13: return
14: for e ∈ blockintra do
15: if e /∈ visited then
16: visited← visited∪{block}
17: DFSVisit(e.target,e,map,visited,h)
The algorithm DOINSTRUMENTATIONLOWERING per-
forms the lowering given an intra-procedural CFG g and a
stack analysis result h. Here we retain the definitions from
Section 3. In addition we define the following. For a CFG g,
let gexits be the set of exits blocks of the function. Also let
groot be the entry basic block of the function. Given a basic
block bb let bbintra be the set of intra-procedural control-flow
outgoing edges of the basic block.
As the first step we clone the CFG with CloneCFG. It
returns a cloned graph and a map from original graph vertices
to the cloned vertices. At line 5, we call AppendStackPop
which instruments each exit block of the cloned graph with a
stack pop.
Next, we traverse the original graph in depth first order and
introduce stack push instrumentation at the first unsafe basic
block encountered at a given control-flow path. At line 10 we
reroute the control flow to transition from the original graph
to the cloned graph with RedirectEdge. We then instrument
the transition edge with stack push instrumentation by calling
AppendStackPush at line 12. AppendStackPush requires the
stack height at the basic block entry so that it can properly
generate the instructions to retrieve the return address. Once
the unsafe node has been processed we immediately return
without visiting its children. This guarantees that any given
control flow will only encounter a single stack push. Figure 3
shows the resulting CFG after performing instrumentation on
fig. 2.
The implementation of DOINSTRUMENTATIONLOWER-
ING requires the capabilities of instrumenting control-flow
edges, cloning CFG elements including basic blocks and
edges, and redirecting control-flow edges. Dyninst supports
all these operations through structured CFG editing [3]. In
our implementation, we add another pass to count the number
of safe control-flow paths. If a function does not contain any
safe control-flow path, we do not perform DOINSTRUMEN-
TATIONLOWERING to avoid unnecessary code cloning.
Safe Path Elision Property Instrumentation lowering, as
presented above, preserves validation-soundness.
Now we prove the above safety property.
Proof : We start by defining the following.
Tainted Region : Let w = b0, ..,bn be a run-time graph
walk (i.e., cycles allowed) of a given an intra-procedural
CFG where each bi is a basic block and where b0 is the
function entry node. Let there be non-empty set B such that,
B = {bi : ¬RA-Safetybb(bi), i ∈ 0, ..,n}. Given B, now we
define the tainted region of the above walk as bi, ..,bn, where
bi is the first basic block satisfying ¬RA-Safetybb(bi) when
traversing the walk w starting from the left.
Now we present couple of lemmas.
Lemma 6.1. Any entry to exit run-time graph walk of an
instrumentation lowered CFG has its tainted region covered
by exactly one shadow stack check (i.e a stack push at the
head of the region and a stack pop at the tail).
Proof : DOINSTRUMENTATIONLOWERING adds a stack push
instrumented transition edge to the cloned graph at the first
unsafe block of a given control-flow path traversed in depth
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Figure 3: Figure 2 after instrumentation lowering performed. The original graph is on the left and the cloned on the right. The
transition edge shown in a dotted line features a stack push. All the exit blocks of the cloned graph contains a stack pop at the
end.
first order. Since this unsafe block is by definition the head
of the tainted region for this path, the stack push occurs just
before the start of the tainted region. Rest of the tainted region
lies within the cloned graph. Since the cloned graph a) does
not contain back edges to the original CFG causing repeated
traversals of the transition edge b) does not have any stack
push instrumentation, no nested stack pushes are possible.
Now, every exit block of the cloned graph is instrumented
with a stack pop at the end. Hence the lowered instrumentation
covers the tainted region of any given control-flow graph walk
with exactly one matching shadow stack push-pop pair in that
order.
Lemma 6.2. Any unsafe basic block occurring within a run-
time control graph walk must lie within a tainted region.
Proof : Given a graph walk the basic block must either be
the first unsafe basic block or non-first unsafe basic block.
In either case, by definition, the basic block falls within the
tainted region of the walk.
Now we consider a run-time call stack S with stack
frames s f0, ..,s fn and a call-chain f0, .., fn similarly defined
as in Section 5. Let b0fi , ..,b
m
fi be the control graph walk
executed in the function fi within the context of the stack
frame s fi. Now lets consider the case where b0f0 , ..,b
m
f0
contains a tainted region. We prove validation-soundness by
considering following two cases.
Case 1: f0 overwrites s f ra0 . Here the return address of
the current frame is overwritten within the tainted region. By
Lemma 6.1, this mutation will be validated by the shadow
stack check which covers the tainted region (possibly)
extended to an exit block (if bmf0 is not an exit block).
Case 2: f0 overwrites s f rai ,0 < i < n + 1. Here we do
induction over the call chain. Since f0 contains one or more
unsafe basic blocks (by the existence of a tainted region), by
definition of RA-Safetyf , f0 satisfies ¬RA-Safetyf ( f0). Now,
given graph walk b0f1 , ..,b
m
f1
within function f1, the block
bmf1 contains an inter-procedural edge to unsafe f0. Hence,
by definition of RA-Safetybb, bmf1 satisfies ¬RA-Safetybb(bmf1).
Now, by Lemma 6.2, bmf1 must fall within a tainted region.
Also by lemma 6.1, this tainted region (extended until a
return block) will be covered with a shadow stack check.
Now assume b0fk , ..,b
m
fk
,k < i contains a tainted region. With
a similar argument as above we can show that there will be an
extended tainted region including b0fk+1 , ..,b
m
fk+1
which will
be covered with a shadow stack check. Hence by induction,
the stack modification at s f rai will be validated by the shadow
stack check which covers the extended tainted region in
b0fi , ..,b
m
fi .
The above two cases apply to any tainted region b0fi , ..,b
m
fi of
fi in a call stack activation S.
7 Optimizing the Mechanism
In previous two sections, we presented a new shadow stack
instrumentation policy that elides instrumentation without
compromising the run-time safety. Now we look in to how
we can improve the instrumentation mechanism, that is, how
we can optimize the shadow stack instrumentation, in order
to bring further overhead reductions.
7.1 Basic Operations
We implement shadow stack operations in a shared library
that we LD_PRELOAD. Shadow stack initialization for the main
thread happens in the library load time constructor and child-
thread stacks get initialized in the interposed pthread_create
function that we provide. Figure 4 illustrates the shadow stack
layout with the segment register gs pointing to the bottom
of the stack. Zeroed guard-words are used to detect run-time
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Figure 4: Shadow memory region layout. Guard words are
zeroed out. Accessing top of the stack requires a double de-
reference. Scratch space can be accessed with a single mem-
ory access via gs:0x8.
stack under-flows while the scratch area is used to hold the
temporary register value in the register frame optimization
described in Section 7.2. We assume that the shadow region
is protected with information hiding [30]. We discuss the
implications of this assumption in section 10.
The push and pop operations mirror regular call stack oper-
ations. In order to support the exceptions and setjmp/longjmp
we repeatedly pop the values from the stack until a match
or an under-flow occurs. Listing 1 shows the instruction se-
quence for push. The pop is similar (though in reverse order
and with the loop) and is provided in the appendix for com-
pleteness. We also note that it is straight-forward to improve
our implementation to also save and validate the frame pointer
register which also detects attacks related to recursive calls.
As per Listing 1 the instruction sequence for a push consists
of 9 instructions and 6 memory accesses. The pop operation
incurs a similar overhead leading to about 20 instructions
and 12 memory accesses per function call from shadow stack
instrumentation.
7.2 Leaf Function Optimizations
We find that leaf functions often contain a small number of
instructions, but are frequently executed, causing significant
overhead. Therefore, we design two novel optimizations for
leaf functions.
Register Frame Optimization: Instead of storing the re-
turn address to the shadow stack, we use a free register to
implement a register stack frame. Listing 2 shows an example
of a register frame push operation. Compared to the basic
stack push operation shown in Listing 1, a register frame
push operation contains only 2 instructions.
We make two observations for the first instruction in List-
ing 2. First, we perform a register usage analysis of the leaf
function to identify a free general purpose register (GPR).
Listing 1 Instruction sequence for basic shadow stack push opera-
tion.
# Create scratch registers
push %r10
push %r11
# Retrieve return address from the stack
mov 0x10(%rsp),%r11
# Retrieve the shadow stack pointer
mov %gs:0x0,%r10
# Save return address to shadow stack
mov %r11,(%r10)
# Move and save the shadow stack pointer
lea 0x8(%r10),%r10
mov %r10,%gs:0x0
# Restore scratch registers
pop %r11
pop %r10
Listing 2 Instruction sequence for register frame push operation.
# Save the register to the scratch space in
# the shadow memory region
mov %r10,%gs:0x8
# Retrieve return address
mov (%rsp),%r10
Note that we still need to save and restore the value of the
chosen GPR because the compiler may not always emit ABI-
compliant code (due to hand coded assembly etc.). Second,
we save the chosen GPR to the scratch space in the shadow
memory region, which is isolated from the original program.
It is unsafe to save the chosen GPR on the execution stack.
The save and restore of the GPR is separated by a unsafe mem-
ory write; otherwise, we would have elided instrumentation
in this function. If the attacker is aware of our defense, the
attacker may control the unsafe write to overwrite the saved
GPR on stack and control this GPR after its restore.
Inlining Leaf Functions: We found that some small leaf
functions are still not inlined even at -O3 optimization level.
Inlining such function calls can completely remove instrumen-
tation. To ensure correctness, we still instrument the original
leaf function in order to catch any indirect calls to it. As it is
difficult to implement a general function inlining mechanism
for binary rewriting, we inline every direct function call to a
leaf function that contains a straight-line code.
7.3 Dead Register Chasing
The basic shadow stack push and pop each need two GPRs
as scratch space. We leverage register liveness analysis to
identify dead registers and if available, use them as scratch
space, thus avoiding context saves for the scratch registers.
We observe that we can move our instrumentation to realize
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Listing 3 An example showing the benefits of moving instrumenta-
tion for more dead registers.
A: # No dead register at function entry
push %rbx
push %r10
# %rbx and %r10 are dead here
mov 0x1234, %rbx
mov %rdi, %r10
more dead registers compared to fixing our instrumentation
at function entry and exit. For example, in Listing 3 if we
instrument at the function entry, %rbx and %r10 are live be-
cause their values are then pushed to the stack. If we move
our shadow stack push operation after the push instruction
sequence, we have two dead registers. In this scenario, we
need to adjust the offset for retrieving return address from the
stack as we have pushed two GPRs to the stack. Currently,
we only move instrumentation within the same basic block
and we cannot move instrumentation beyond unsafe memory
writes or unsafe function calls.
8 Improving Dyninst
We chose Dyninst as the instrumentation tool for implement-
ing our shadow stack because it provides the required capa-
bilities for implementing safe path elision and it is a unified
framework for applying binary analysis for optimizing the
instrumentation.
However, we observed that the baseline overhead of
Dyninst (i.e., with empty instrumentation) is prohibitive with
overheads of more than 100% in some applications. In this
section, we highlight some key improvements that we made
to Dyninst in order to reduce this base line overhead.
First, we briefly summarize Dyninst’s operation and define
some terminology. When a user instruments a function F ,
Dyninst will copy the entire body of F to a newly allocated
memory region. We call the copied F as the relocated func-
tion, which will hold the instrumentation. When relocating
a function, Dyninst needs to adjust instructions in F to com-
pensate for the new execution location, including PC-relative
addressing and return addresses on the stack for exception
unwinding. Dyninst then installs trampolines in original F
to transfer execution from original F to relocated F . Lastly,
Dyninst adds its run-time library libdyninstAPI_RT.so as a
dependency for the rewritten binary, which provides some
runtime routines needed by Dyninst instrumentation.
8.1 Improving Exception Unwinding
Dyninst currently compensates for exception unwinding by
emulating a function call [4]. As function calls in instru-
mentation are in a new memory region, there will be no
.eh_frame information corresponding to these new addresses
for unwinding the stack, or .gcc_except_table information
for finding the code blocks that catch exceptions. Therefore,
a three instruction sequence, call next_insn; add [%rsp],
$off; jmp $target is used to emulate a call instruction call
$target, where call next_insn pushes the current PC to the
stack and $off represents the address distance between the re-
located call instruction and the original call instruction. In this
way, Dyninst ensures that the instrumentation is transparent
to stack unwinding and catching exceptions.
Unfortunately, such call emulation significantly increases
the overhead of making a function call. As Dyninst has to
emulate every function call whose callee may throw an excep-
tion, a large number of function calls are emulated for C++
programs. Empirically, we observed call emulation caused
about 30% overhead in some of the SPEC CPU 2017 C++
benchmarks.
To remove the overhead of call emulation, we observe that
exception unwinding is not a common operation. So, we de-
fer the translation from relocated PC to original PC from
call time to stack unwind time. Specifically, we first compile
libunwind with exception unwinding support and pre-load
libunwind to ensure exception unwinding uses libunwind in-
stead of libstdc++.so. We then wrap the x86_64_step func-
tion from libunwind, which unwinds a stack frame given the
register state. We wrap this function in libdyninstAPI_RT.so
to translate the recovered return address from relocated code
to original code. This additional translation cost is negligible
compared to other stack unwinding operations. Hence our
improved exception unwinding has negligible overhead.
8.2 Trampoline Installation and Execution
Dyninst currently installs trampolines at function entry block,
target blocks of a jump table, and blocks that catch exceptions.
The binary analysis component in Dyninst is responsible for
identifying these blocks [23]. These trampolines are critical
for the correctness of instrumentation because indirect calls,
indirect jumps, and exception unwinding will cause the con-
trol flow to be back to execute the original code. In most cases,
a trampoline is implemented as a direct branch, which is a
five byte long instruction on x86-64. In cases where there is
not enough space for a five byte branch instruction, Dyninst
installs a one-byte breakpoint instruction and registers a sig-
nal handler to transfer the execution. The signal handler and
the signal registration are in libdyninstAPI_RT.so.
We observed two performance problems caused by trampo-
lines. First, frequent execution of breakpoint instructions are
prohibitively expensive. Second, frequent execution of tram-
polines indicated that the execution was bouncing between
the original and relocated code, which increased the i-cache
pressure. To address these two problems, we implemented
following optimizations:
Multi-branch trampoline: On x86-64, the five byte
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branch has a 32-bit displacement, which is typically large
enough to branch to relocated code. The idea of a multi-
branch trampoline is to make use of the two-byte branch in-
struction, which has a [−128,127] branch range and enables
us to jump to nearby padding bytes, which may hold a five
byte branch instruction. In practice, the compiler frequently
emits padding bytes to align branch targets and function starts.
So, this optimization effectively reduces the use of breakpoint
trampoline.
Jump table rewriting: Dyninst statically resolves jump
table targets by calculating a symbolic expression for the
indirect jump target [23]. Using the symbolic expression, we
can plug in the addresses of relocated target blocks and solve
for the values that should be written into the jump table. The
rewritten jump tables will ensure that the execution will stay
in relocated code. With jump table rewriting, there is no need
to install trampolines at jump table target blocks any more.
Function pointer rewriting: Indirect calls will redirect
execution back to the original code and require trampolines
at function entries. We reduced the execution frequency of
such trampolines by rewriting function pointers identified in
code and data sections. For this, we scan each quad-words
(8 bytes long) in .data and .rodata sections. If a quad-word
matches the entry address of an instrumented function, we
modify the quad-words to the entry of the relocated code.
Similarly, we scan each instruction in .text; if we find an im-
mediate operand or a PC-relative addressing operand matches
an instrumented function entry, we adjust them accordingly.
This optimization does not guarantee that all pointers in the
programs are adjusted, so it is still required to install trampo-
lines at all instrumented function entries. However, it reduces
the number of times that trampolines are executed.
8.3 Customized Instrumentation Setup
Dyninst often emits additional instruction around the instru-
mentation to ensure instrumentation does not break the orig-
inal program, including saving and restoring register states,
including GPRs and XMM registers, adjusting for stack red-
zone, aligning stack pointer, and guarding for recursive in-
strumentation. While Dyninst has internal heuristics to skip
certain steps, they do not satisfy our need. We observed that
Dyninst may emit as many as 100 additional instructions per
instrumentation site. So we modified Dyninst to allow the
users to specify which steps are necessary.
As shown in Listing 2 and Listing 3, our instrumentation
sequences properly save and restore used register states. And,
our instrumentation does not call any other functions; so, there
is no need to guard for recursive instrumentation or to align
the stack pointer. Since our leaf function instrumentation does
not write to the stack, there is no need to protect stack red-
zone. For non-leaf functions, when we instrument at function
entry or exit, since stack red-zone space is not used for pass-
ing parameters or return values, our instrumentation is correct.
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Figure 5: SPEC 2017 results. FULL mode represents the results
of instrumenting every function without any of our optimiza-
tions. LIGHT mode represents the results of instrumentation
with all optimizations enabled.
When we find a non-leaf function contains stack red-zone
write, we will apply safe path elision for this function only if
we find two dead registers to avoid writes to the stack. In sum-
mary, we control Dyninst to emit no additional instructions
without hurting the correctness of instrumentation.
9 Evaluation
We evaluated our techniques with SPEC CPU 2017 standard
benchmarks and with couple of real world server applica-
tions (Redis and Apache HTTP server). The benchmarks
were run on a machine with Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2695
at 2.10GHz, 128GB memory, running Red Hat 7. We used
Dyninst 10.1 for carrying out the shadow stack instrumenta-
tion.
9.1 SPEC CPU 2017 Results and Analysis
The SPEC CPU 2017 benchmarks were compiled with GCC-
6.4.0, with the default optimization level (-O3). The bench-
marks were run five times each. Figure 5 shows the overheads
for SPEC CPU 2017. FULL mode is the baseline unoptimized
shadow-stack with no instrumentation elision. LIGHT mode
corresponds to the fully optimized shadow-stack with all pol-
icy and mechanism optimizations applied. Our optimizations
yield significant overhead reductions over the baseline. LIGHT
mode has a 2.4% geometric mean overhead and a 14.1% maxi-
mal overhead (600.perlbench_s), while FULL mode has a 8.1%
geometric mean overhead and a 26.8% maximal overhead
(620.omnetpp_s).
Policy vs. Mechanism In order to break down the impact of
the various policy and mechanism optimizations, we selected
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Figure 6: Results for seven high overhead benchmarks in
SPEC 2017 with partial optimization enabled. EMPTY repre-
sents relocating all functions with empty instrumentation.
FULL and LIGHT are copied from Figure 5 for reference. SFE
represents applying only safe function elision described in
Section 5. PO represents applying SFE and safe path elision
described in Section 6. MO represents our shadow stack mech-
anism optimizations described in Section 7.
seven high overhead benchmarks from the suite and measured
the overhead with a subset of optimizations enabled. Figure 6
shows the effects of policy vs. mechanism optimizations. We
make three observations.
First, EMPTY represents Dyninst run-time overhead due to
trampolines and relocated code. We measure this by instru-
menting all the functions with an empty instrumentation. With
our improvements in Section 8 the EMPTY overhead is now
less than 2% on average (down from 100% in some cases).
We believe that these improvements are necessary for making
Dyninst acceptable for binary hardening use cases.
Second, we observe that safe function elision (SFE) always
yields an overhead reduction. Also, in most cases safe path
elision (SPE) compliments SFE with roughly cumulative over-
head reductions. However, we attribute small overhead jumps
with SPE to the way edge instrumentation is currently imple-
mented in Dyninst. At present, Dyninst introduces the stack
push in the transition edge (see fig. 3) as a separate basic
block and does not inline it to the source block even when it
is possible to do so, which results in an additional branch.
Third, we observe that our mechanism optimizations (MO)
also yield significant overhead reductions, even more so than
the policy optimizations (PO). But more importantly, com-
bined together, PO and MO result in overhead reductions greater
than when individually applied (except for 631.deepsjeng_s).
In Figure 5 and Figure 6, we observed several negative
overhead numbers for certain benchmarks, such as 621.wcf_s
with FULL mode and 657.xz_s with LIGHT mode. Our optimiza-
tions not only change the policy and mechanism of shadow
stacks, but also change the layout of the executable, which
can impact i-cache efficiency and branch prediction accuracy.
We believe such a layout change can accidentally improve
performance. It is interesting to investigate the interactions
between code layout caused by instrumentation and the ex-
ecution efficiency, as other existing work has also reported
negative overheads for a small subset of benchmarks [5]. We
leave this investigation as future work.
Individual Optimizations Next, we investigate the exclu-
sive contribution to overhead reduction from each optimiza-
tion. The exclusive contribution can be measured by disabling
one optimization with all other optimization enabled. The
results are shown in Figure 7. We make the following obser-
vations.
First, each optimization makes unique contribution for re-
ducing overhead, even though in certain cases an optimization
may have slight negative impact on overhead reduction. We
already explained how SPE may lead to extra branch instruc-
tions and thus, jumps in overhead. Binary function inlining
may cause extra i-cache pressure. However, taken as a whole,
all optimizations lead to a positive overhead reduction.
Second, the overhead reductions from different optimiza-
tions are not additive. For example, SPE and DRC may be con-
flicting. SPE moves instrumentation from function entry to
a later position in the function. It is possible that we have
sufficient dead registers at function entry, but no dead regis-
ters when instrumentation is lowered. If the safe control-flow
paths are infrequently executed this lowering may result in
a performance loss. Path execution frequency is a dynamic
property which can only be obtained via a path profile [2].
So this leads to the idea of profile-guided instrumentation;
where instrumentation can be made optimal with respect to
both safe control-flow paths and dead registers using profile
data. We leave this as future work.
Finally, we do not have safe function elision in this figure
as safe path elision is defined based on the assumption that
safe function elision is enabled.
Applicability of Optimizations To better understand the
applicability of our optimizations, we also collected statistics
on how many functions that each major optimization applies
to. Table 1 shows that our policy optimizations (SFE + SPE)
cumulatively apply to about 35% of functions on average.
However, they result in significant overhead reductions since
these optimizations capture frequently executed leaf/ near-leaf
functions.
Memory Write Classification Our safe path and function
elision are based on RA-Safety which uses stack height anal-
ysis in order to determine unsafe memory writes. An unsafe
memory write or an indirect function call will cause a basic
block to be unsafe, and thus ruling out both safe path and
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Figure 7: Results for seven high overhead benchmarks in
SPEC 2017 with partial optimization enabled. LIGHT results
are copied from Figure 5 for reference. Safe path elision, reg-
ister frame, binary function inlining, and dead register chasing
are denoted as SPE, RF, INLINE, and DRC, respectively.
Table 1: Function instrumentation statistics. “SFE”, “SPE”,
and “RF” columns present the percentages of the total func-
tions, to which safe function elision, safe path elision, and
register frame optimization are applied. All optimizations are
non overlapping.
Benchmark SFE SPE RF Total
600.perlbench_s 14% 31% 1% 2336
602.gcc_s 20% 34% 2% 12157
603.bwaves_s 2% 2% 0% 42
605.mcf_s 19% 21% 12% 43
607.cactuBSSN_s 35% 15% 1% 2716
619.lbm_s 3% 7% 3% 29
620.omnetpp_s 18% 10% 5% 5434
621.wrf_s 24% 8% 33% 7274
623.xalancbmk_s 30% 13% 7% 3875
625.x264_s 13% 17% 27% 540
628.pop2_s 11% 12% 7% 2007
631.deepsjeng_s 37% 17% 12% 115
638.imagick_s 23% 25% 1% 2351
641.leela_s 29% 17% 11% 335
644.nab_s 13% 20% 6% 236
648.exchange2_s 14% 14% 0% 14
649.fotonik3d_s 7% 5% 4% 125
654.roms_s 45% 10% 4% 333
657.xz_s 25% 27% 5% 362
mean 20% 15% 7%
safe function elision. Table 2 breaks down the percentages
of different types of memory writes in each benchmark. The
“Global” column represents memory writes that write to a stat-
ically determined address; these memory writes are typically
PC-relative addressed, with an address in .data or .rodata
sections. Such global writes are guaranteed to not overwrite
Table 2: Memory write classification. “Stack” column rep-
resents safe stack writes which only access the local stack
frame. “Global” column represents writes to globals. “Unsafe”
is rest of the memory writes.
Benchmark Stack Global Unsafe Total
600.perlbench_s 49% 9% 42% 40,145
602.gcc_s 55% 9% 36% 146,665
603.bwaves_s 67% 0% 33% 2672
605.mcf_s 32% 1% 66% 839
607.cactuBSSN_s 55% 9% 36% 75,392
619.lbm_s 81% 1% 18% 155
620.omnetpp_s 49% 3% 48% 41,404
621.wrf_s 82% 2% 16% 305,282
623.xalancbmk_s 56% 1% 43% 124,472
625.x264_s 38% 0% 62% 16,180
628.pop2_s 76% 4% 20% 146,811
631.deepsjeng_s 44% 9% 47% 2283
638.imagick_s 53% 0% 47% 41,909
641.leela_s 43% 0% 57% 6185
644.nab_s 46% 13% 40% 5662
648.exchange2_s 52% 3% 45% 2926
649.fotonik3d_s 86% 8% 6% 9999
654.roms_s 84% 4% 12% 27,471
657.xz_s 37% 1% 62% 5019
any return addresses. The “Unsafe” column combines several
types of memory writes including a) stack writes with nega-
tive stack heights (i.e: writes to a non local frame) b) memory
writes which our stack analysis was unable to classify as be-
ing stack writes. In practice this second category may contain
heap memory writes and writes to memory references passed
via function arguments etc. Our current analysis yields unsafe
write percentages ranging from 6% to 66%. We can poten-
tially improve the effectiveness of safe function elision and
safe path elision by improving the precision of this memory
classification by:
• incorporating a heap points-to analysis so that heap
writes can be ruled out from the unsafe set
• extending the analysis to be inter-procedural so that heap
and stack references passed as arguments can be tracked
and ruled out as safe at access sites.
We leave this as future work.
9.2 Server Benchmark Results and Analysis
We also measured the overhead of shadow stack protection
on couple of server benchmarks. We use the throughput re-
duction as the main overhead metric for this evaluation. In
these experiments, we only instrument the server binary; we
do no instrument the benchmark client. We used following
server setups:
Redis: We compiled Redis-5.0.7 [32] with GCC-6.4.0 with
its default optimization level (-O2). Redis provides a bench-
mark client redis-benchmark. We ran it with the default input
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Table 3: Redis benchmark throughput reduction results. The
numbers are averaged by 10 runs.
Operation LIGHT FULL
PING_INLINE -1.76% 12.70%
PING_BULK 5.48% 13.41%
SET 3.24% 7.48%
GET 7.07% 19.24%
INCR 0.84% 4.91%
LPUSH -6.81% 16.12%
RPUSH -7.84% 10.88%
LPOP -5.25% 17.43%
RPOP -5.98% 12.64%
SADD 4.21% 16.42%
HSET -1.15% 16.47%
SPOP -6.41% 23.95%
LPUSH -3.42% 16.88%
LRANGE_100 -2.38% 12.25%
LRANGE_300 0.83% 15.41%
LRANGE_450 0.74% 13.77%
LRANGE_600 1.11% 11.82%
MSET (10 keys) 1.71% 12.99%
Table 4: Apache HTTP server benchmark results.
No. of clients
Latency increase Throughput decrese
LIGHT FULL LIGHT FULL
1 1.0% 6.0% 1.0% 7.0%
4 -0.7% 2.0% 0.3% 3.0%
8 -0.8% 0.5% -1.0% 2.0%
parameters, which means 50 parallel connections and 100,000
total requests. The experiment was repeated for 10 times. Ta-
ble 3 presents the results for the LIGHT mode and the FULL
mode. Our results show that our optimizations can signifi-
cantly reduce the overhead; the largest throughput reduction
is 7.07% for operation GET.
Apache HTTP Server: We ran ab (a client program) on
the httpd server instances, by transmitting a 150KB html file
with number of clients 1, 4 and 8. Table 4 shows that our
optimizations are effective for reducing overhead.
9.3 RIPE64 Benchmark
RIPE [34] is a runtime intrusion prevention evaluator, imple-
menting a large set of buffer overflow attacks. RIPE64 [13] is
a port of the original 32 bit implementation to 64 bits. Among
all attacks implemented by in RIPE64, 24 attacks are trig-
gered through overflowing a buffer on the stack to overwrite
a return address on the stack. Without our instrumentation,
23 attacks always succeeded and 1 attack often succeeded.
With our instrumentation, all 24 attacks always failed. This
further validates our theoretical result about the soundness of
RA-Safety based instrumentation elision.
10 Discussion and Related Work
Memory Protection: We assume that shadow region is pro-
tected via information hiding [30] similar to previous litera-
ture [5, 9]. However, recent works [15, 18, 24] demonstrate
that information hiding is insufficient to prevent information
leakage even on 64-bit systems. But unfortunately current
schemes for implementing safe memory-regions on x64 in-
cur high overheads [20]. Implementing cheap, safe memory-
regions on x64 remains an interesting future research.
Hardware implementations: Upcoming Intel Control-flow
Enforcement Technology [19] includes a hardware shadow
stack. However, it will be at least several years before CET
enabled hardware reach mass adoption since no CET enabled
hardware has been released yet. Even then, it will be impor-
tant to protect programs running on legacy hardware. Intel
Processor Trace (PT) has also been shown to be effective for
implementing shadow stacks [16].
Compiler protections: Our techniques might as well be im-
plemented as a compiler protection. In fact, some compil-
ers have recently implemented shadow stack protection [12].
Also, all major compilers feature a -fstack-protector stack
canary protection [33] that leverages certain heuristics in
order to skip the canary checks at certain functions [11].
However to our knowledge, ours is the first work which ex-
plores an instrumentation elision policy with a well defined
threat model and with a theoretical study of soundness. If
implemented within a compiler, our instrumentation policies
may yield greater overhead reductions since compiler-based
memory analysis and indirect call analysis [21] can be more
precise when compared to our binary analyses.
Binary instrumentation: We use static binary rewriting as
opposed to run-time binary instrumentation which may be ap-
plied without the need of a pre-processing step. Even though
there has been some recent work on lightweight run-time in-
strumentation [7, 8, 14], since we still need to carry out heavy
weight static analyses as part of the instrumentation, we move
all of the instrumentation tasks to before run-time.
Static analysis performance: Our current static analyses fin-
ish in a few minutes. With more precise binary analysis to
analyze memory writes and indirect calls such as C++ virtual
functions [26, 28, 36], the analysis time may become a con-
cern. Dyninst has started parallelizing its binary analysis with
multi-threading [22], which is promising for addressing the
concern of increased analysis time.
11 Conclusion
In this paper we presented several new techniques for reduc-
ing shadow stack overhead inspired by the design principle
of separating mechanism and policy. We demonstrated that it
is possible to derive an instrumentation policy for eliding in-
strumentation on provably safe code regions. We also demon-
strated how this instrumentation elision policy compliments
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improvements to the instrumentation mechanism by imple-
menting several novel code optimizations. Our techniques
are general, and can be used to improve the performance of
existing compiler or other software-based shadow stacks.
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Listing 4 Instruction sequence for shadow stack pop operation.
When the return address matches a value in the shadow stack, the
execution exits through label L1. When there is no match for the
return address, the execution exits through label L2 and triggers
an abort. Exiting through L1 is the most common case. Label L3
represents the start of the loop for unwinding the shadow stack.
# Create scratch registers
push %r10
push %r11
# Load the shadow stack pointer
mov %gs:0x0,%r10
L3:
# Move back the shadow stack pointer
lea -0x8(%r10),%r10
# Load the value from shadow stack
mov (%r10),%r11
# Store the shadow stack pointer
mov %r10,%gs:0x0
# Compare return address with
# the one in shadow stack
cmp 0x10(%rsp),%r11
je L1
# Keep comparing until reaching
# the bottom of the shadow stack
cmpl $0x0,(%r10)
je L2
jmp L3
L2:
call abort
L1:
pop %r11
pop %r10
Listing 5 Instruction sequence for register frame pop operation.
When the return address matches the value in the register frame, the
execution exits through label L1. When there has been exception
unwinding or setjmp/longjmp and the return address matches a
value in the shadow stack, the execution exits through label L2.
When there is no match for the return address, the execution exits
through label L3 and triggers an abort. Exiting through L1 is the
most common case. Label L4 represents the start of the loop for
unwinding the shadow stack.
# Compare return address on the stack
# with the value in the register frame
cmp (%rsp),%r13
je L1
# Create scratch registers for unwinding
# the shadow stack
push %r10
push %r11
# Load the shadow stack pointer
mov %gs:0x0,%r10
L4:
# Move back the shadow stack pointer
lea -0x8(%r10),%r10
# Load the value from shadow stack
mov (%r10),%r11
# Store the shadow stack pointer
mov %r10,%gs:0x0
# Compare return address with current
# shadow stack frame
cmp 0x10(%rsp),%r11
je L2
# If we reach the bottom of the shadow
# stack, we encounter a unmatched return
# address, triggering an SIGILL
cmpl $0x0,(%r10)
je L3
jmp L4
L3:
call abort
L2:
pop %r11
pop %r10
L1:
mov %gs:0x8,%r13
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